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1 Introduction 
The design of corporation income taxes has long raised difficult questions because of 
the complex structure of corporate operations, the flexibility of corporate decisions, and 
the need to trace the ultimate influence of taxes on corporations through to their 
shareholders, customers and employees and other affected groups. But the nature of 
these questions has evolved over the past few decades, as advances in economic theory 
and evidence have resolved some issues and changes in corporate practices and 
government policies have raised others. This paper discusses current issues in the 
design of a corporation tax system and specific reform proposals that have been under 
recent discussion.   
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out a framework for 
characterising different options for taxing corporate income. It describes the structure of 
the corporation tax system currently in operation in the UK and outlines significant 
reforms to the structure of the UK corporate tax system since the Meade Report. Section 
3 puts these reforms in the context of changes to corporate tax systems in other 
countries and presents evidence on trends in corporation tax revenues and the industrial 
composition of revenues. Section 4 discusses developments since the Meade Report that 
affect the design of a corporate income tax system. These include both economic 
changes and advances in the research literature. We discuss the implications of 
increased international capital mobility and of the asymmetric treatment of debt and 
equity and consider how the tax system affects a firm’s choice of organisational form. 
Section 5 considers optimal properties of corporation taxes in order to develop criteria 
against which options for reform can be assessed. In light of this, and the evidence 
presented in section 4, Section 6 considers specific options for corporation tax reform. 
We offer some concluding comments in Section 7. 
2 Characterising a corporate income tax system 
To aid comparison of different reforms we begin by briefly laying out a framework for 
characterising different options for taxing corporate income. We do so in an open 
economy setting, where firms’ productive activity, sales, profits and shareholders can be 
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located in different countries. We then place the proposals from the Meade Report and 
the current UK corporate tax system within this framework. 
Table 1 characterises different ways of taxing corporate income in an open economy 
along two dimensions - the location of the tax base and the type of income subject to 
business tax.1 Considering the different locations, alternative tax bases are, corporate 
income earned in the country where productive activity takes place (source-based 
taxation), income earned in the residence country of the corporate headquarters or 
personal shareholders (residence-based taxation), or the sales (net of costs) in the 
destination country where the goods or services are finally consumed (destination-based 
taxation). Alternatives for the type of income included in the tax base are: first, the full 
return to corporate equity, including the normal return on investment and economic 
rents over and above the normal return; second, the full return to all capital investment 
including debt; and finally, only economic rents. 
Table 1. Characterising capital income tax systems 
Type of income subject to business tax Location of tax base 
Full return to equity Full return to capital Rent 
Source country 1. Conventional 
corporate income tax 
with exemption of 
foreign source income 
4. Dual income tax 
 
5. Comprehensive 
Business Income Tax 
6. Corporation tax with 
an Allowance for 
Corporate Equity 
 
7. Source-based cash 
flow corporation tax 
Residence country  
(corporate 
shareholders) 
2. Residence-base 
corporate income tax 
with a credit for foreign 
taxes 
 
  
Residence country  
(personal shareholders) 
3. Residence-based 
shareholder tax 
 
  
Destination country  
(final consumption) 
  8. Full destination-
based cash flow tax 
 
9. VAT-type 
destination-based cash 
flow tax 
 
                                                 
1 This framework follows that in Devereux and Sørensen (2005) 
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We discuss the specific systems in the table in section 6, but first it is useful to place the 
options discussed in the Meade Report within this framework. Meade’s alternative tax 
bases, the real (R base), real and financial (R+F base) and share (S base) were all 
options for source-based taxation2 which aimed to tax only economic rent. Taxing only 
economic rent can be considered desirable since it is non-distortionary, leaving the 
(normal) return earned by the marginal investment free of tax. Table 2 provides a simple 
outline of the R, R+F and S bases. Under these bases, taxing only rent is achieved by 
allowing all expenses to be deduced from taxable profits as they are incurred, 
essentially taxing positive (inward) and (negative) outward cash flows at the same rate. 
In practice, as outlined below for the UK system, many corporate tax systems do tax the 
normal return to capital in addition to economic rent, thus affecting the cost of capital 
and potentially introducing distortions in firms’ choices over different forms of finance. 
Table 2. R, R+F and S bases 
 R base R + F base S = R + F base 
Inflows Sales of products, services, 
fixed assets 
Sales of products, services, 
fixed assets 
 
Increase in borrowing, 
interest received 
 
Repurchase of shares, 
dividend payments 
 
 Minus Minus Minus 
Outflows Purchases of materials, 
wages, fixed assets 
Purchases of materials, 
wages, fixed assets 
 
Repayment of borrowing, 
interest paid 
Increase in own shares 
issued, dividends received 
 
A further characteristic of a corporate tax system which is of relevance is its 
relationship with the personal tax system. This can be thought of in two dimensions. 
First, some businesses have a choice with respect to the system under which they are 
taxed, for example in the UK whether they incorporate or whether the owner of the 
business is registered as self-employed and taxed under the personal tax system. 
Differential tax treatment under these alternatives can potentially affect the choice of 
organisational form. The second dimension in which the interaction of the corporate and 
                                                 
2 In fact in the closed economy setting considered, source, residence and destination would all be the same location. 
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personal tax systems is of relevance is the tax treatment of shareholders in incorporated 
businesses. Under a classical system dividend income is taxed twice, at the corporate 
and at the personal level. Alternatively, an imputation system alleviates double taxation 
by making an allowance for all or some of the corporate tax already paid when 
calculating the income tax owed by the dividend recipient. Realised gains on equity 
investment may also be subject to capital gains tax at the personal level. 
2.1 The UK corporate tax system 
The UK corporate tax system taxes UK-resident companies (i.e. those with UK 
headquarters) on their global profits (with a credit for tax paid on profits generated 
abroad), and taxes non-UK resident companies on their profits generated in the UK. 
Corporation tax is charged on income from trading, investment and capital gains, less 
specific deductions. In particular the system allows interest payments to be deducted 
from taxable profits and can be characterised as taxing the full return to equity, rather 
than the full return to all capital investment. The UK system therefore comprises a 
combination of residence-based and source-based systems numbered 1 and 2 in table 1.  
The main rate of corporation tax in the UK currently stands at 30% with a lower small 
companies’ rate of 19% for firms with taxable profits up to £300,000. Firms with 
taxable profits between £300,001 and £1,500,000 are subject to marginal relief so that 
the marginal tax rate they face on their profits above £300,000 is 32.75%, and the 
average tax rate they face on their total profits rises gradually from 19% to 30% as total 
taxable profits increase. Table 3 summarises the different rates.3 In 2004-05 only 
around 5% of companies paid corporation tax at the main rate, however, they accounted 
for 75% of total profits chargeable to corporation tax.4 See Crawford and Freedman in 
this volume for further discussion of the taxation of small businesses. 
Current expenditure such as wages is deductible from taxable profits and firms can 
claim capital allowances which allow a deduction for depreciation of capital assets. For 
                                                 
3 We do not discuss the separate regime for the taxation of North Sea Oil production (reference UK tax system 
survey chapter). 
4 http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/corporate_tax/11-3-corporation-tax.pdf 
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example, expenditure on plant and machinery is written down on a 25% declining 
balance basis, (50% in the first year for small and medium-sized companies), and 
expenditure on industrial buildings is written down at 4% per year on a straight line 
basis. 
Table 3. UK corporation tax rates, 2006-07 
Taxable profits (£ per year) Marginal tax rate (%) Average tax rate (%) 
0-300,000 19 19 
300,001-1,500,000 32.75 19-30 
1,500,000 plus 30 30 
Source: HM Revenue and Customs, http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/rates/corp.htm. 
 
Capital expenditure related to research and development (R&D) receives more generous 
treatment under the ‘R&D allowance’ and receives a 100% immediate deduction. Under 
the R&D tax credit current R&D expenditure also receives more favourable treatment 
than other forms of current expenditure. Large companies can deduct 125% of eligible 
R&D expenditure, and small and medium-sized companies can either deduct 150% of 
eligible expenditure, or if they are loss-making can receive the credit as a cash payment. 
Since the early 1980s the UK corporation tax system has moved away from the taxation 
of economic rent towards taxing the full return to equity through a broadening of the tax 
base brought about by a reduction in the value of capital allowances. Box 1 summarises 
some of the main reforms. The main changes occurred during the mid-1980s with the 
phasing out of 100% first year allowances for plant and machinery and 50% initial 
allowances for industrial buildings.5 This broadening of the tax base was accompanied 
by a substantial fall in the statutory rate (from 52% in 1982-83 to 35% by 1986-87), and 
this type of restructuring has been mirrored in other countries as discussed in sections 3 
and 4. Since the mid-1980s there have been a series of further falls in the main rate of 
corporation tax and in the rate of advanced corporation tax (ACT) (from 30% in 1985-
86 to 20% in 1994-95), which was paid by the company at the time it distributed 
dividends.6 ACT was then abolished in 1999-00. The small companies’ rate has also 
                                                 
5 The first year allowance was applied in place of the writing down allowance, while an initial allowance was applied 
on top of the writing down allowance. 
6 The remainder of the corporation tax due, mainstream corporation tax, was paid nine months after the end of a 
firm’s financial year. After ACT was abolished a new quarterly payments system was introduced for large 
companies. 
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been reduced in line with falls in the basic rate of income tax. However from 1997-98 
onwards the small companies rate has been below the basic rate of income tax. 
Box 1. UK corporate tax reforms since the Meade Report 
In 1978 at the publication of the Meade Report, the main CT rate was 52% and the 
small companies’ rate 40%. There was a first year allowance of 100% for plant and 
machinery and an initial allowance of 50% for industrial buildings. Yearly writing 
down allowances were 25% for plant and machinery (reducing balance) and 4% for 
industrial buildings (straight line). 
1983: Small companies’ rate cut from 40% to 38% from 1982-83. 
1984: Announcement of stepwise reduction in CT rates, from 52% in 1982-83 to 35% 
in 1986/87. First year and initial allowances phased out by 1986/87. Small companies’ 
rate cut in one step to 30% from 1983-84. 
1986: Small companies’ rate cut from 30% to 29%. 
1987: Small companies’ rate cut from 29% to 27%. 
1988: Small companies’ rate cut from 27% to 25%. 
1991: CT rate cut from 35% to 34% in 1990-91 and to 33% from 1991-92. 
1992: Temporary enhanced capital allowances between November 1992 and October 
1993. First-year allowance of 40% on plant and machinery and initial allowance of 20% 
on industrial buildings.  
1995: Small companies’ rate cut from 25% to 24%. 
1996: Small companies’ rate cut from 24% to 23%. 
1997: Main CT rate cut from 33% to 31%. Small companies’ rate cut from 23% to 21%. 
Windfall tax imposed on privatised utilities. Repayment of dividend tax credits 
abolished for pension funds. 
1998: Main CT rate cut from 31% to 30%, small companies’ rate cut from 21% to 20% 
from 1999-00. ACT abolished from 1999-00. System of quarterly instalment tax 
payments phased in from 1999-00. Repayment of dividend tax credits abolished for tax-
exempt shareholders and rate of dividend tax credit reduced from 20% to 10% from 
1999-00. 
1999: New starting rate for small companies introduced at 10% from 2000-01.  
2002: Small companies’ rate cut from 20% to 19%. Starting rate cut from 10% to 0%. 
2004: Minimum rate of 19% for distributed profits introduced. 
2006: 0% starting rate abolished 2006-07. 
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3 Trends in corporation tax rates and revenues 
The base-broadening, rate-cutting reforms to the structure of the UK corporation tax in 
the mid-1980s have also been carried out in other countries. Figures 1 and 2 show that 
both statutory corporation tax rates and the value of depreciation allowances have been 
falling across the G7 economies. Figure 1 shows falling statutory rates, and for this 
group of countries some evidence of convergence to main rates between 30% to 40%. 
There are some differences in the timing of cuts in statutory rates across countries. The 
figure shows the UK and USA making significant cuts to the main rate in the mid 
1980s, whereas Italy (having previously raised the main rate), Japan and Germany only 
make significant cuts from the late 1990s onwards. Figure 2 shows declines in the 
present discounted value of depreciation allowances; most noticeably the significant 
base-broadening reform in the UK in the mid-1980s. The implications of these reforms 
for the effective tax rates faced by companies are discussed further in section 4. 
Figure 1. Statutory corporation tax rates 
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Source: Devereux, Griffith and Klemm (2002), updated, table A1 
http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications.php?publication_id=3210
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Figure 2. Present Discounted Value of depreciation allowances 
50.0
60.0
70.0
80.0
90.0
100.0
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
Year
PD
V 
(%
)
FRA
UK
GER
ITA
JAP
USA
CAN
 
Notes: Definition: The PDV of allowances is calculated for an investment in plant and machinery. 
Special first year allowances are included if applicable. Where switching between straight-line and 
reducing balance methods is allowed, such switching is assumed at the optimal point. The assumed real 
discount rate is 10%, the assumed rate of inflation is 3.5%. 
Source: Devereux, Griffith and Klemm (2002), updated, table A2 
http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications.php?publication_id=3210 
 
For the UK these reforms have not led to significant changes in the share of corporation 
tax receipts in total tax revenues, or in corporation tax receipts measured as a share of 
GDP. Figure 3 shows corporation tax revenues as a share of total tax receipts for the G7 
over the period 1970 to 2004. Although there is some fluctuation over the period 
corporation tax revenues in the UK make up around 8% of total UK tax revenues at the 
beginning and end of the period. For the remaining G7 countries, other than for Japan 
there is no evidence of a substantial decline in the share of corporation tax revenues in 
total tax receipts. Figure 4 shows that UK corporation tax revenues comprised between 
2% and 4% of GDP over the period. Though falls in corporation tax revenues as a 
proportion of GDP generally coincide with periods of recession, the decline in 2002 and 
2003 appears to be an anomaly. 
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Figure 3. Corporation tax revenues as % total tax revenues 
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Figure 4. UK corporation tax revenues as a % of GDP 
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Devereux, Griffith and Klemm (2004) also consider evidence on the size of the 
corporate sector and on rates of profitability underlying UK corporate tax revenues. 
Using data for the non-financial sector they do not find any evidence of a significant 
change in the rate of profitability for this sector of the economy from 1980 to 2001. 
They find some evidence of an expansion in the size of the corporate sector (measured 
by profits as a share of GDP), which, given the evidence on the profitability rates in the 
non-financial sector, they conclude could be due to some combination of a general 
expansion or an increase in profitability in the financial sector.   
For the UK and the US there is evidence of significant changes in the sectoral 
composition of revenues, most strikingly in the share of total corporate tax revenues 
accruing from the financial sector. Since the early 1980s, in the UK there has been a 
substantial increase in the share of total profits that are chargeable to corporation tax 
arising in the banking, finance and insurance sector, (and in service sectors more 
broadly) and a decrease in the manufacturing sector share. Figure 5 shows that the 
increase in the share due to financial corporations is also mirrored in the US. The two 
countries show an increase from around 5% to 10% in the early 1980s to over 25% of 
corporation tax revenues in 2003. This increased importance of the financial sector 
demonstrates that discussion of reforms to the corporation tax system should consider 
implications for both the financial and non-financial sectors. 
Finally, Auerbach (2006) presents evidence for the US on a further factor underlying 
the continued strength of corporation tax revenues – an increase in recent years in the 
value of losses relative to positive taxable income. Since taxable income and losses are 
treated asymmetrically under corporation tax systems, (losses do not receive an 
immediate rebate and firms may have to wait until they earn sufficient taxable profits to 
offset them, and may also face a delay in claiming capital allowances thus reducing 
their value), this increase in the value of losses led to an increase in the average tax rate 
on net corporate profits (positive income net of losses). This trend may signal a need to 
re-examine this asymmetry within corporate tax systems and the extent to which it 
distorts investment decisions.  
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Figure 5. Taxes on financial corporations as a share of corporate tax revenues, UK 
and US 
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In summary the evidence suggests that corporate tax revenues have continued to make a 
substantial contribution to total tax receipts despite falls in statutory rates. A potential 
driver of these reductions in corporation tax rates is increased tax competition between 
countries seeking to attract mobile capital. We consider this issue in more detail in 
section 4, together with evidence on other economic developments and advances in the 
academic literature affecting the design of corporation tax systems. 
4 Developments affecting the design of a corporate 
income tax system 
In this section we trace important developments since the Meade Committee reported, 
and identify how they might affect the design of tax policy. These developments are of 
several forms.  
There have clearly been changes in the economic position of the UK and of the rest of 
the world. The most prominent is globalisation; and in particular, the rise of 
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international flows of capital and of profit. This raises several issues which were not 
fully discussed by the Meade Committee. For example, in a globalised world, the owner 
(typically the supplier of equity finance) of an investment project may be resident in a 
different jurisdiction from where the project is undertaken; which may be different 
again from where the consumer of the final product may reside. This raises several 
important and difficult questions. 
First, where is profit generated? And is this actually an appropriate question for taxation 
– should the international tax system attempt to tax profit where it is located, or on 
some other basis? To the extent that the international tax system aims to identify the 
location of profit and tax it where it is located, then there are incentives for 
multinational companies to manipulate the apparent location of profit (conditional on 
where real economic activity takes place) in order to place it in a relatively lightly taxed 
country. 
Second, another aspect of this difference in jurisdiction between activity and owner is 
the role of personal taxes. At the time the Meade committee reported, many countries – 
especially in Europe – had some form of integration of corporate and individual taxes. 
For example, the UK had an imputation system, under which UK shareholders received 
a tax credit associated with a dividend payment out of UK taxable income; this credit 
reduced the overall level of tax on UK sourced corporate profit distributed to UK 
shareholders. But increasingly the ownership of UK companies has passed to non-UK 
residents. The relevance of such a tax credit for efficiency or equity purposes is 
therefore open to question.  
A third consequence of globalisation is that companies make discrete investment 
choices: for example, whether to locate an operation in the UK or Ireland. Although 
there may be many other examples of discrete choices (whether to undertake R&D or 
not, whether to expand into a new market or not), it is the discrete location choice which 
has received most attention to date. The influence of tax on a discrete investment choice 
is rather different from the case analysed by Meade, and the flow-of-funds taxes 
advocated by Meade would not generally be neutral with respect to discrete choice. 
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A fourth aspect of increased globalisation is tax competition between countries. In order 
to attract internationally mobile capital into their jurisdiction, governments have to offer 
a business environment at least comparable to that available elsewhere. The taxation of 
profits is part of that environment. Consequently, there has been downward pressure on 
various forms of tax rates, as globalisation and other factors have led to lower statutory 
and effective tax rates. 
There have also been developments in the type of economic activity seen in the UK and 
other major industrialised countries. Manufacturing has played a decreasing role in the 
economy; services and the financial sector are now very much more important. This 
suggests that at least one of the traditional aspects of corporation taxes – the rate of 
depreciation allowed on buildings and plant and machinery – has shrunk in importance. 
By contrast, investment in intangibles and financial assets has become more important. 
Incentives for R&D are common. Also, the taxation of profit in the financial sector is 
quantitatively more important. 
Part of the development of the financial sector has involved innovation in financial 
products. The traditional distinction between debt and equity is much less clear than it 
might have appeared to the Meade Committee. The combination of characteristics 
which apply to traditional debt are that it has a prior claim to income generated, it 
receives a return which is determined in advance (in the absence of bankruptcy), and 
that debt-holders typically do not have voting rights. But there is no reason for a single 
financial instrument to have either all or none of these characteristics. If an instrument 
has only one or two of these characteristics, it may be difficult to define as debt or 
equity. This issue becomes still more complex when combined with the effects of 
globalisation, where countries may not take the same view as to whether an instrument 
qualifies as debt and therefore whether the return should be deductible in the hands of 
the borrower and taxable in the hands of the lender. 
There have also been developments in economic theory. One important development 
returns to the role of personal taxes. The “new view” of dividend taxation states that 
dividend taxes do not affect investment decisions. If at the margin investment is 
financed by retained earnings and the tax rate on dividend income remains constant, 
then the net cost to the shareholder is reduced by dividend taxes at exactly the same rate 
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at which the eventual return is taxed. These two effects cancel out to leave the required 
rate of return unaffected, and hence the effective marginal tax rate equal to zero. In fact 
this is a very similar effect to that generated by the S-based corporation tax analysed by 
the Meade Committee, since taxes on net distributions are a form of cash flow tax. The 
same argument would apply to investment financed by new share issues if a tax credit 
were associated with the new issue, as would be the case under the S-base.  
In the remainder of this section we look in more detail at some of these developments. 
We begin by considering aspects of globalisation: how does international integration 
affect the manner in which taxes can affect business decisions? We then briefly consider 
the issue of tax competition among countries. Next we turn to consider how 
developments in financial markets, and particularly in financial instruments, affect the 
choice of whether a tax regime should differentiate between debt and equity. Finally, 
we address issues in personal taxation, and consider whether integration of corporate 
and personal taxes is a necessary feature of overall taxes on profit.  
In each of these cases, we examine in principle how taxes can create distortions. We 
also briefly summarise evidence on the extent to which business decisions are affected 
by tax, and investigate the implications for tax design. 
4.1 Decisions of multinational corporations  
A useful approach to considering the impact of corporation taxes on flows of capital and 
profit is to first describe a simple approach to understanding the choices of 
multinational firms. The model described here is a simple extension of the basic model 
of horizontal expansion of multinational firms, drawing specifically on Horstman and 
Markusen (1992). Many extensions are examined by Markusen (2002), but it is not 
necessary to address them in any detail here. 
To understand the effects of tax, it is useful to consider a simple example. Suppose a US 
company wants to enter the European market. It is useful to think of four steps of 
decision-making. First, a company must make the discrete choice as to whether to enter 
the market by producing at home and exporting, or by producing abroad. To make this 
discrete choice, the company must assess the net post-tax income of each strategy. 
Exporting from the USA to Europe will incur transport costs per unit of output 
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transported. Producing in Europe will eliminate, or at least reduce, transport costs, but 
may incur additional fixed costs of setting up a facility there. The choice therefore 
depends on the scale of activity, and the size of the various costs. The scale of the 
activity would depend on the choices made in stages 2 to 4 below. 
What is the role of corporation taxes in this decision? If production takes place in the 
USA, then the net income generated would typically be taxed in the USA. If production 
takes place in a European country, then the net income generated will generally be 
taxed by the government in that country. There may be a further tax charge on the 
repatriation of any income to the USA. Taking all these taxes into account, the company 
would choose the higher post-tax profit. Conditional on a pre-tax income stream, the 
role of tax is captured by an average tax rate – essentially the proportion of the pre-tax 
income which is taken in tax. 
If the company chooses to produce abroad, the second step faced by the company is 
where to locate production. The company must choose a specific location within Europe 
to produce, for example within the UK or Germany. This is a second discrete choice. 
The role of tax is similar to that in the first discrete choice, and can be measured by an 
average tax rate.  
The third step represents the traditional investment model in the economics literature, 
and the one considered by the Meade Committee: conditional on a particular location – 
say the UK - the firm must choose the scale of its investment. This is a marginal 
decision. The company should invest up to the point at which the marginal product of 
capital equals the cost of capital. As such the impact of taxation should be measured by 
the influence of the tax on the cost of capital – determined by a marginal tax rate. Under 
a flow-of-funds tax, such as proposed by the Meade Committee, this marginal tax rate is 
zero; the tax therefore does not affect this third step in decision-making. 
In a slightly different model, this third step might play a more important role. Suppose 
that the multinational firm already has production plants in several locations. If it has 
unused capacity in existing plants, then it could choose where to generate new output 
amongst existing plants. The role of tax would again be at the margin, in that the 
company need not be choosing between alternative discrete options. However, note that 
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this is a different framework: in effect, it implies that the firm has not already optimised 
investment in each plant up to the point at which the marginal product equalled the cost 
of capital. 
The fourth step in the approach described here is the choice of the location of profit. 
Having generated taxable income, a company may have the opportunity to choose 
where it would like to locate the taxable income. Multinationals typically have at least 
some discretion over where taxable income is declared: profit can be located in a low 
tax rate jurisdiction in a number of ways. For example, lending by a subsidiary in a low 
tax jurisdiction to subsidiary in a high tax jurisdiction generates in a tax-deductible 
interest payment in the high tax jurisdiction and additional taxable income in the low 
tax jurisdiction. Hence taxable income is shifted between the two jurisdictions. The 
transfer price of intermediate goods sold by one subsidiary to the other may also be very 
difficult to determine, especially if the good is very specific to the firm. Manipulating 
this price also gives the multinational company an opportunity to ensure that profit is 
declared in the low tax jurisdiction rather than the high tax jurisdiction.  
Of course, there are limits to the extent to which multinational companies can engage in 
such shifting of profit. (If there were no limit, then we should expect to observe all 
profit arising in a zero-rate tax haven, with no corporation tax collected elsewhere). 
Indeed, companies can argue that complications over transfer prices may even work to 
their disadvantage: if the two tax authorities involved do not agree on a particular price, 
then it is possible that the same income may be subject to taxation in both jurisdictions.  
Broadly, one should expect the location of profit to be determined primarily by the 
statutory tax rate. It is plausible to suppose that companies take advantage of all tax 
allowances in any jurisdiction in which they operate. Having done so, their advantage in 
being able to transfer a pound of profit from a high-tax jurisdiction to a low-tax one 
depends on differences in the statutory rate.7 However, many of the complications of 
corporation tax regimes have been developed precisely to prevent excessive movement 
of profit; so there are many technical rules which are also important.  
                                                 
7 It may also depend on withholding taxes and the tax treatment the parent company.  
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There is growing empirical evidence of the influence of taxation on each of the four 
steps outlined here. For example, Devereux and Griffith (1998) presented evidence that 
the discrete location decisions of US multinationals within Europe were affected by an 
effective average tax rate rather than an effective marginal tax rate. Similar evidence 
has been found by subsequent papers.8 The estimated size of the effects of taxation on 
the allocation of capital across countries is typically much larger than the estimated size 
of the effect of taxation on the scale of investment in a given country.  
There is also a large empirical literature which investigates the impact of tax on the 
location of taxable income. This literature has three broad approaches: a comparison of 
rates of profit amongst jurisdictions; an examination of the impact of taxes on financial 
policy, especially the choice of debt and the choice of repatriation of profit; and other 
indirect approaches have also been taken, including examining the choice of legal form, 
the pattern of intra-firm trade and the impact of taxes on transfer prices. Much of the 
literature has found significant and large effects of tax on these business decisions. 
The four-stage problem outlined above involves three different measures of an effective 
tax rate. The first two discrete choices depend on an effective average tax rate. The third 
stage depends on an effective marginal tax rate. And the fourth depends on the statutory 
tax rate. This makes the tax design problem complicated. It is possible to design a tax 
system which generates a zero effective marginal tax rate, and this is what the Meade 
Committee proposed. But this clearly does not ensure neutrality with respect to the four 
decisions outlined here. Eliminating tax from having any influence on these decisions 
could only be achieved if the effective marginal tax rate were zero and the effective 
average tax rate and the statutory tax rate were the same in all jurisdictions. This would 
clearly require a degree of international cooperation which is beyond reasonable 
expectation. However, while achieving complete neutrality with respect to the location 
of capital and profit would be beneficial from a global viewpoint, as noted above, this 
may not be true from the view point of any individual country.  
                                                 
8 Earlier papers used measures of average tax rates, but did not do so explicitly with the intention of testing the effect 
of tax on discrete choices; typically they were used as a proxy for effective marginal tax rates.  
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4.2 Tax competition  
Tax competition can clearly result from a situation in which governments do not 
cooperate with each other. In that case, governments may seek to compete with each 
other over scarce resources.  
The factor most commonly considered as a scarce resource in the academic literature is 
capital – the funds available for investment. In a small open economy, the post-tax rate 
of return available to investors is fixed on the world market. Any local tax cannot 
change the post-tax rate of return to investors, but must raise the required pre-tax rate of 
return in that country; this would generally be achieved by having lower capital located 
there. Strategic competition would be introduced in a situation where there were a 
relatively small number of countries involved in attempting to attract inward 
investment. In this case the outcome of such competition would depend on the degree to 
which capital is mobile across countries and the cost to the government of raising 
revenue from other sources. In line with the discussion above, such competition may be 
over average tax rates for discrete choices, over marginal tax rates for investment, and 
over statutory tax rates for the shifting of profits. Overall, governments may be 
competing over several different aspects of corporation taxes.9 
Several empirical papers, largely in the political science literature, attempt to explain 
corporation tax rates with a variety of variables, including political variables, the size of 
the economy, how open it is, and the income tax rate. Some of these papers start from 
the premise of competition. However, we know of only two papers which attempt to test 
whether there is strategic international competition in corporation taxes.10 These papers 
find empirical support for the hypothesis that tax rates in one country tend to depend on 
tax rates in other countries; there is support for the hypothesis that other countries 
follow the USA, but also for more general forms of competition.   
                                                 
9 Haufler and Schjelderup (2000) and Devereux et al (2006) analyse the case of simultaneous competition over the 
statutory rate and a marginal rate; there have been no studies attempting to model competition also over an average 
rate. 
10 Altshuler and Goodspeed (2000) and Devereux et al (2006).  
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What role does competition play in the design of corporation taxes? Essentially it acts 
as a constraint. In a closed economy, in principle, a flow-of-funds tax could be levied at 
a statutory rate of 99% and still have no distorting effect on investment; the effective 
marginal tax rate – which affects investment in such a setting remains zero even with a 
very high tax rate.11 However, in open economies, competition would almost certainly 
rule out a very high statutory rate, and might also constrain the choice of effective 
marginal and average tax rates. This might affect the design of the tax system. If there 
were a specific revenue requirement, and an upper limit on the tax rate, for example, the 
revenue might be achieved only by broadening the tax base – which in turn implies 
increasing the marginal tax rate and hence distorting investment decisions. This creates 
a trade-off in competition for capital and competition for profit, although governments 
can in principle use the two tax instruments of the rate and base to compete for both 
simultaneously.   
4.3 Debt versus equity 
The Meade report recognized the differing tax treatment of income accruing to owners 
of debt and equity as a source of economic distortion, and recommended alternative 
methods of taxing business returns – utilizing the R, R+F and S bases as discussed 
earlier in the chapter – aimed at removing the influence of taxation from the debt-equity 
choice. Under each of these tax bases, the returns to marginal investment financed by 
debt and equity each would be taxed at an effective rate of zero, so in principle neither 
the investment decision nor the financial decision would be distorted. 
In the years since the Meade report, several developments have shaped consideration of 
how to reform the tax treatment of corporate debt and equity. First, empirical research 
has clarified the strength of the behavioural response of corporate financial decisions to 
taxation. Second, financial innovation has raised questions about the ability of tax 
authorities to distinguish debt from equity, highlighting the potential problems of tax 
systems seeking to distinguish between debt and equity. Indeed, as will be discussed, 
                                                 
11 This abstracts, of course, from other domestic activities that might be influenced by a high statutory tax rate, such 
as managerial effort or the diversion of corporate resources. 
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such problems might arise even under the Meade report’s reformed tax bases in spite of 
their apparently neutral treatment of debt and equity. 
4.3.1 Taxation and the debt-equity decision 
With a classical tax system that permits the deduction of interest payments but, until 
2003, offered no offsetting tax benefits for the payment of dividends, the United States 
has taxed equity and debt quite differently and therefore offers an opportunity to 
consider the behavioural response of corporate financial decisions. But uncovering 
corporate financial responses to this disparate treatment is not straightforward, given 
that the U.S. corporate tax rate has changed relatively infrequently over time and that 
essentially all corporations face the same marginal tax rate on corporate income. The 
major identifying strategy utilized in empirical research in the years since the Meade 
report has been based on the asymmetric tax treatment of income and losses, under 
which income is taxed as it is earned but losses can generate a commensurate refund 
only to the extent that they can be deducted against the corporation’s prior or future 
years’ income. For firms with current losses and without adequate prior income to offset 
these losses, the need to carry losses forward without interest (and subject eventually to 
expiration) reduces the tax benefit of additional interest deductions. 
Calculations by Altshuler and Auerbach (1990) for the early 1980s suggested that tax 
asymmetries were quantitatively important for the U.S. corporate sector as a whole and 
that there was also considerable heterogeneity with respect to the value of interest 
deductions, depending on a corporation’s current and recent tax status. Thus, tax 
asymmetries did provide a useful source of variation in the tax incentive to borrow.  
Using a somewhat different methodology, Graham (1996) also found considerable 
variation across firms in the potential tax benefit of additional interest deductions, and 
used this variation to assess the influence on corporate decisions, finding a significant 
response.  This confirmed the results of earlier empirical research that used cruder 
measures of tax status as determinants of borrowing.12 Related research has found an 
influence of a company’s tax status on its decision to lease equipment rather than 
                                                 
12 See Auerbach (2002) for a survey of this and related research discussed below. 
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borrowing to purchase it, the lease providing a method of shifting the interest and 
investment-related deductions to a lessor with potentially greater ability to utilize 
deductions immediately. 
The observed reaction of borrowing to tax incentives confirms that the tax treatment of 
debt and equity influences corporate financial decisions, although it does not show that 
economic distortion is minimized when debt and equity are treated equally. Another 
strand of the literature on corporate behaviour, dating from Berle and Means (1932) and 
revived especially in the years following the Meade report, emphasizes the distinction 
between corporate ownership and control and the potential divergence of interests 
between corporate managers and shareholders. This work suggests that the decisions of 
executives may not be efficient or in the shareholders’ interest. In this setting, tax 
distortions need not reduce economic efficiency, and this is relevant for the tax 
treatment of borrowing, given that some, notably Jensen (1986), have argued that the 
increased commitments to pay interest serve as an incentive to elicit greater efforts from 
entrenched managers. Thus, while a tax bias in favour of interest appears to encourage 
borrowing, it is harder to say whether it encourages too much borrowing. 
4.3.2 Financial innovation 
The literature provides unfortunately little guidance as to how taxes on financial 
decisions might be used to offset managerial incentive problems. But recent 
developments in financial markets cast this issue in a different light.  By blurring the 
debt-equity distinction and potentially transforming the debt-equity decision into one of 
minor economic significance (tax treatment aside), financial innovation may have 
lessened any potential benefits of encouraging corporate borrowing and moved us more 
toward a situation in which corporations incur real costs in order to achieve more 
favourable tax treatment but are otherwise unaffected in their behaviour. 
The empirical results mentioned above, showing the sensitivity of leasing to tax 
incentives, provide on example of how borrowing may be disguised or recharacterized 
to take advantage of tax provisions. But many more alternatives have gained popularity 
over the years.  The basic thrust has been to narrow the distinction between debt and 
equity through the use of financial derivatives and hybrid instruments. 
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Starting with the Black-Scholes (1973) option-pricing model, it has been come to be 
understood how the prices of shares and derivatives based on these shares must be 
related in a financial market equilibrium in which investors can hold the same 
underlying claims in different form. Relevant to the debt-equity decision, one can move 
from a position in shares to a position in debt by selling call options and purchasing put 
options, with the “put-call parity theorem” indicating that the two positions, being 
essentially perfect substitutes, should have the same market value. But when the tax 
treatment of these equivalent positions differs at the individual and corporate levels, the 
incentive is to choose the tax-favoured position, a choice that is essentially unrelated to 
the other activities of the corporation. 
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Legal restrictions have been attempted but are difficult to implement, given the many 
alternative methods of using derivatives to construct equivalent positions, methods that 
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have grown in popularity as financial transaction costs have declined.13 The result has 
been a growth in the issuance of so-called “hybrid” securities, based on ordinary debt 
and structured with enough similarity to debt to qualify for favourable tax treatment but 
also incorporating derivatives designed to allow the securities to substitute for regular 
equity. Figure 6 shows the volume of U.S. hybrid-security issues for the period 2001-5, 
along with the volume of common equity issues, confirming that hybrid securities have 
become a significant source of funds for corporations. 
4.3.3 Implications for tax reform 
In light of financial innovation and the blurring of the distinction between debt and 
equity, how should one view the Meade report’s recommendations for taxing business 
activities? Under the R base, no distinction is made between debt and equity.  
Regardless of how funds are raised, there are no taxes on the flows between businesses 
and their investors. Thus, businesses may choose among debt, equity and hybrid 
securities without consideration of the tax consequences. Under the R+F base, however, 
a timing distinction would remain between debt and equity, with equity being ignored 
by the tax system and debt being provided an effective tax rate of zero through 
offsetting taxes on borrowing and interest and principal repayments. For marketable 
securities issued at arm’s length, the timing distinction is minor, but related-party 
transactions could take advantage of the difference by reporting lower payments to 
equity and higher payments to debt, thereby converting tax-free payments into tax-
deductible payments to the same investors. The R base would seem a preferable policy 
to the R+F base from this perspective, but an offsetting factor is the treatment of real 
and financial flows in product markets, in the interactions not with investors but with 
customers. 
Under the R+F base, real and financial transactions with customers are treated 
symmetrically, with sales subject to taxation and expenses deductible. Under the R base, 
financial proceeds and expenses are ignored, so that firms providing the same customers 
with both real and financial products have an incentive to overstate the profits from 
                                                 
13 For further discussion, see Warren (2004). 
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financial services and understate the profits from real activities. A related problem 
concerns financial companies, a sector that, as discussed earlier, has been growing 
steadily in importance in the UK. The returns that financial companies earn from the 
spreads generated by financial intermediation are automatically picked up by the R+F 
base but ignored under the R base. 
Innovation in finance thus favours the R-base version of the Meade report’s company 
tax system, while the growing importance of companies that specialize or engage in 
providing financial services calls for the R+F base. Which approach is to be preferred is 
discussed further below, but the benefits of either approach are clear in comparison to a 
system that attempts to maintain an even greater distinction between debt and equity. 
4.4 Relationship between corporate and personal income taxes 
Traditionally, the corporation income tax has been seen as imposing an extra level of 
taxation on investment in the corporate sector, thereby discouraging corporate 
investment activity and shifting capital from the corporate sector to the non-corporate 
sector. The alternatives offered by the Meade report were aimed to remove this 
distortion of investment activity. However, the report devoted relatively little attention 
to the level at which taxes were imposed – investor or company – or to the choices other 
than the level of investment or the method of finance (already discussed) that might be 
distorted by the corporate tax, notably the choice of a company’s organizational form.  
In the years since, the theoretical and empirical research has considered how corporate-
level and investor-level taxes may vary in their effects on investment, and how 
corporate taxation influences the choice of organizational form and other corporate 
decisions. As a result, we have a different perspective on both the priorities and the 
potential alternatives for corporate tax reform. 
4.4.1 Corporate and personal income taxes and the incentive to invest 
Dating to the work of Harberger (1962), the corporation tax was viewed as an extra tax 
imposed on the investment returns generated by the corporate sector, with personal 
income taxes applied to both corporate and non-corporate investment. From this 
perspective, reducing the tax burden on corporate source income, either through a 
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reduction in the corporate tax rate or through a reduction in investor-level taxes on 
corporate source income, would improve the economy-wide allocation of capital.  
Indeed, policies such as the UK imputation system were structured to reduce the double 
taxation of corporate-source income. 
Since the Meade report, there have been several challenges to the argument for 
alleviating double taxation. Miller (1977) hypothesized an equilibrium in which 
investment financed by corporate equity faced no extra tax when compared to debt-
financed investment or non-corporate investment, as a result of the interaction of 
progressive individual taxation and the favourable tax treatment of equity at the investor 
level (due to lighter and deferred taxation of capital gains). For individuals in 
sufficiently high personal tax brackets, Miller argued, the tax gain at the individual level 
would just offset the extra tax at the corporate level. If only individuals with such a tax 
preference for equity held shares, then the corporate tax would impose no extra tax on 
corporate investment, but indeed would reduce the overall tax on the returns of high-
bracket investors. Thus, reducing the corporate tax would favour the corporate sector 
even more, as would reducing individual taxes on corporate source income. Although 
actual shareholding patterns do not follow the market segmentation envisioned by 
Miller, diversification can be understood as a balancing of tax incentives and portfolio 
choice that does not fully undercut Miller’s argument (Auerbach and King 1983). 
Another line of reasoning, complementary to Miller’s, suggests that the tax burden on 
equity investment is lower than would be implied by simply averaging of the tax rates 
on dividends and capital gains. Following an argument by King (1974), developed 
further in Auerbach (1979) and Bradford (1981), equity funds acquired through the 
retention of earnings should, under certain assumptions, have a before-tax cost 
unaffected by the tax rate on dividends; the logic is that because dividend taxes are 
avoided when earnings are retained, subsequent dividend taxes are merely deferred 
payment of the dividend taxes avoided initially, not additional taxes investment 
earnings. This logic suggested that reducing taxes on dividends, either directly or, for 
example, through an imputation system, should have no impact on investment 
incentives except to the extent that firms issue new equity. While various empirical tests 
have not definitively resolved its significance in explaining the investment behaviour 
 26
and valuation of corporations14, this “new view” of equity finance clearly emphasizes 
the distinction between ongoing equity finance through retentions and the initial 
capitalization of corporate enterprises, a distinction laid out, for example, by Sinn 
(1991) in a model integrating the capitalization and subsequent growth of a firm subject 
to taxes on corporate earnings and dividends. We will return to this distinction between 
capitalization and investment when discussing the choice of organizational form. 
A related point is the relevance of corporate cash flow to the investment decision.  
Among firms facing a lower cost of capital when financing through retentions, there 
will be a positive relationship between investment and the level of internal funds, for 
some investments will be worth undertaking only if adequate internal funds are 
available.  This relationship, which has found some support in the empirical literature 
since the writing of the Meade report15, may also be a consequence of asymmetric 
information: if managers are unable to reveal their firms’ true prospects to capital 
markets, then the act of seeking external funds may convey a negative signal about a 
firm and raise its cost of capital. Whatever the reason for its existence, a link between 
internal funds and investment makes after-tax cash flow relevant to a firm’s investment. 
Thus, traditional calculations of the cost of capital and marginal effective tax rates 
based on discounted tax provisions may only partially measure the impact of these tax 
provisions on the incentive to invest – the timing of these provisions will matter, too. 
4.4.2 Personal taxes and the multinational enterprise 
In a closed economy, savings equals investment and it does not matter on which side of 
the market for funds taxes are imposed, assuming that the taxes on each side would 
have the same structural form. The previous arguments have suggested that the 
structure of individual taxes on corporate-source income serves to mitigate the impact 
of double-taxation. Progressive individual taxes combined with favourable treatment of 
capital gains plus the taxation of dividends when they are distributed (rather than when 
                                                 
14 See Auerbach (2002) and Auerbach and Hassett (2005) for recent reviews of the relevant literature. 
15 The paper by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) is notable here, although some (e.g., Cummins, Hassett and 
Oliner 2006) have argued that cash flow is simply acting as a proxy for firm prospects that are difficult to measure 
directly. 
 27
corporate earnings accrue) each contribute to a lower tax burden on the income from 
new corporate investment. But this analysis does not hinge on the fact that the taxes in 
question are assessed on investors rather than on companies. In an open economy, 
though, taxes on saving and investment may not have comparable effects, even if they 
are similar in structure, and as a result there is an additional reason why investor-level 
taxes may have little impact on the incentives for investment. 
The tax treatment of multinational enterprises is an extremely complex subject, touched 
on above and treated more fully in the chapter in this volume by Griffith, Hines, and 
Sørensen. However, if one thinks of the taxation of companies as being largely done at 
source, and the taxation of investors as being based on residence, then the openness of 
the UK economy to capital flows increases the impact of company-level taxation on 
domestic investment, for such investment must compete for mobile capital with 
investment projects in other countries. The taxation of individual UK investors on their 
portfolio income, on the other hand, should have relatively little impact on UK 
investment, for UK investors are only one possible source of funds for domestic 
enterprises and other investors will jump in to take advantage of potentially higher 
returns should individual tax provisions discourage UK investors. 
The strength of this reasoning depends on the extent to which the well-known “home 
bias” in the portfolio choice of investors is overcome. If individuals invest primarily in 
their own countries, regardless of the tax incentives for investing abroad, then such tax 
incentives can have little impact.  Such home bias has certainly been evident historically 
in the close relationship between domestic saving and investment (e.g., Feldstein and 
Horioka 1980) as well as in the weak international diversification of individual 
portfolios. But such diversification has been on the rise over time. As Figure 7 shows, 
around a third of UK listed shares are now held by foreign investors, compared to 
around 5 percent when the Meade report appeared. 
 
 
Figure 7. Ownership of UK listed shares by Rest of the World 
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Thus, the rise in international capital flows provides yet another reason why individual 
taxes may have less influence than once believed on the level of domestic corporate 
investment.  There is a distinction here, though, in that higher taxes on the portfolios of 
domestic individuals may still have a considerable impact on national saving, depending 
on how responsive saving is to capital income taxation. 
4.4.3 Taxes and the choice of organizational form 
As discussed above, it is important to distinguish the effects of taxation on existing 
companies and new ones. While existing corporations may finance their expansions 
through retained earnings, new corporations must establish an equity base and may face 
a higher cost of capital as a result. As a consequence, the decision to start a corporation 
may be discouraged more than the decision to invest, once incorporated. If there is a 
choice of organizational form, this decision may be affected by corporate taxation. 
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Put slightly differently, one needs to distinguish how taxation affects the intensive 
decisions of companies – how much to invest, given their organizational form – and the 
extensive decisions of companies – which organizational form to adopt. Just as in the 
case of the international location decision, the choice regarding organizational form 
depends on more than the treatment of marginal investment projects by existing 
companies whose locations are already determined. 
It is customary to think of the choice of organizational form as one unlikely to be 
strongly affected by taxation, because corporate status, with its limited liability and 
access to capital markets, is viewed as a sine qua non for large public companies that 
seek broad ownership. Indeed, in the UK there are no perfect substitutes for corporate 
status outside the corporate sector.  But elsewhere, particularly in the United States, 
there are ranges of organizational forms that, while not perfect substitutes, offer 
attributes sufficiently similar to those of traditional corporations to make the choice of 
organizational form a serious one. 
Figure 8. S Corporation Share of U.S. Non-financial Corporate Income 
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Figure 8 shows the share of US non-financial corporate income accounted for by “S” 
corporations, the most important alternative to traditional corporations. S corporations 
have legal corporate status but are taxed as “pass-through” entities. Though an option 
only for companies with one class of stock and no more than one hundred shareholders, 
S corporations nevertheless now account for a significant part of corporate ownership. 
The upward jump in 1987 is consistent with incentives in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 
the transition to S corporation status largest among the smaller companies most likely to 
view this as viable (Auerbach and Slemrod 1997). But the subsequent growth in S 
corporation elections may be due to a variety of factors including shifts in company size 
and industrial composition, and the literature to date (Gordon and Mackie-Mason 1997, 
Goolsbee 1998) suggests relatively modest behavioural responses to tax incentives, and 
hence small deadweight losses, surrounding the choice of organizational form. 
4.4.4 Implications for Tax Reform 
A recurring theme in the discussion of the interaction of personal and corporate taxes is 
the importance of heterogeneity. Individuals sorting by tax rates may reduce the 
combined impact of corporate and individual taxes; firms financing with retained 
earnings may face a lower cost of capital than is faced by new corporations; individual 
taxes may influence the cost of capital more for domestic companies that rely solely on 
domestic investors as a source of funds than for those capitalized internationally; and 
smaller firms with simpler ownership structures may have a greater ability to avoid the 
traditional corporate form if it is advantageous from a tax perspective to do so. 
This heterogeneity in behavioural responses suggests a need for flexibility in the design 
of tax reforms not emphasized in the Meade report, to allow treatment to vary among 
firms and individuals according to circumstances. We might wish to treat domestic 
companies differently from multinational companies, new companies differently from 
existing ones, and small companies differently from large ones,16 and we might wish to 
vary the extent of double-taxation relief among individual investors. 
                                                 
16 Crawford and Freedman (this volume) deal with the particular issues of designing tax regimes for small 
companies. 
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5 Optimal properties of corporation taxes 
This section discusses what the aims of a corporation tax should be in closed and open 
economies. In open economies, one must distinguish between the perspectives of a 
country acting unilaterally and one acting in coordination with other countries. 
The first and most important question to address is “Why corporate taxes?” To the 
extent that corporate taxes play a role that could be occupied by taxes on individuals, 
why tax corporations at all? From a positive perspective, corporate taxes may exist in 
part because of the political advantage of imposing taxes the burdens of which are 
difficult to trace through to individuals. But there are also several potential normative 
justifications for taxing corporations. 
First, corporations may offer an easier point of tax collection, even if the aim is to 
impose a tax on individuals. It may be easier, for example, to impose a tax on 
consumption using a tax on corporate cash flows rather than a personal consumption 
tax. Second, the base of taxation may be most easily measured at the corporate level. 
For example, if the aim is to tax rents generated by corporate activities, there is no 
advantage in tracing the receipt of these rents to individuals rather than taxing them 
directly. Third, taxing corporations may expand the scope of possible tax bases. If a 
country wishes to tax foreign shareholders of domestic corporations, for example, this 
may be legally possible and administratively feasible only through a tax on the 
corporations directly. 
Thus, there may be a role for taxes on corporations, but the role will depend on the 
characteristics of the optimal tax system. For example, if there is no benefit to taxing 
foreign shareholders, then there will be no advantage to imposing taxes on domestic 
corporations in order to do so. Thus, we must first lay out the characteristics of a desired 
tax system before assessing the advantages of particular forms of corporate taxation. We 
begin by considering the simpler case of the closed economy, in which there is no issue 
of international coordination and taxes on saving and investment have equivalent 
effects. 
Since Meade a literature has developed on the optimal tax rate on capital income in a 
closed economy.  Various celebrated papers, beginning with Judd (1985) and Chamley 
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(1986), argue that the optimal capital income tax rate in a dynamic setting is zero, 
though others find conditions under which it is positive. A second strand of the 
literature has emphasized the dispersions in effective tax rates that typically accompany 
capital income taxation and the distortions associated with this differential taxation.17 
Although the message of this literature reinforces arguments against a classical 
corporate tax system, it is consistent with the Meade approach of aiming for a zero 
effective marginal tax rate on corporate source income. Such a tax falls on projects 
which earn an economic rent, and on old capital (which has not received cash flow 
treatment of expenses). In a closed economy, taxes on rents are non-distortionary, as are 
taxes on old capital, to the extent that such taxes are not anticipated. Thus, there is an 
argument for imposing corporate taxes in a closed economy even if capital income taxes 
are not desirable. To the extent that capital income taxes remain part of the optimal tax 
system, corporate taxes can play a role as a collection mechanism, although the 
additional distortions associated with corporate taxation, discussed in section 4, must be 
taken into account. 
In an open economy, one must be more specific regarding the manner in which capital 
income taxes are imposed. Where it may be optimal to distort the saving decisions of 
residents, a country may wish to impose residence-based capital income taxes.  But the 
literature, starting from the production efficiency theorem of Diamond and Mirrlees 
(1971) and developed in various contexts in the years since the Meade report, suggests 
that small open economies should eschew source-based capital income taxation. Such a 
tax simply raises the pre-tax required rate of return and reduces the stock of capital, 
shifting none of the burden to foreigners but resulting in more deadweight loss than a 
tax on the domestic factors that bear the tax. Just as source-based capital taxes should be 
avoided, the returns from outbound investment by residents should be taxed at the same 
rate as their returns on domestic investment; foreign taxes should be treated as an 
expense. This is a direct implication of imposing taxes on a residence basis. 
These results, however, hold exactly only for small open economies acting unilaterally. 
Moreover, they apply to taxes on individual residents, where such residence is taken as 
                                                 
17 See, for example, King and Fullerton (1984) and Auerbach (1983). 
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given. When one shifts to a consideration of corporate taxes, the picture becomes 
cloudy, because a corporation’s residence may differ from that of its shareholders and 
may also be much more easily adjusted in response to taxation. To the extent that 
corporations are internationally mobile, taxes based on residence may have undesired 
effects similar to taxes based on source. Thus, the distinction between source-based and 
residence-based taxes is less clear for corporate income taxes than for taxes on 
individuals, and residence-based taxes are less obviously superior. 
Open-economy considerations also affect what it takes to accomplish a zero rate on 
business activities. While the Meade flow-of-funds tax would accomplish this objective 
in a domestic-only context, the discrete location and profit shifting possibilities imply 
that a small open economy might wish to have a zero tax rate on average returns and on 
moveable profits, an outcome possible only by eliminating source-based taxes entirely. 
In this case, source-based taxes might be justified only to the extent that there are 
location-specific economic rents, though such taxes might still be unattractive if they 
had to apply economy-wide.  
If small open countries coordinate, then the range of polices expands. Coordinated 
source-based taxation, for example, could serve as a substitute for residence-based 
taxation if the latter approach were not feasible, although to an extent limited by 
different national revenue objectives and constraints. Hence, the role for source-based 
taxes may be stronger than for the small open economy acting on its own. 
The most complex open-economy analysis applies to the choices made by a country for 
which the small-economy assumption does not hold.  For such countries acting 
unilaterally, tax polices that serve the national interest need not further the objective of 
economic efficiency. Just as the optimal tariff for a large country is positive, the optimal 
source-based capital income tax is positive, for each action improves the country’s 
terms of trade with the rest of the world. This strengthens the argument for policy 
coordination, which is also more difficult to analyze because of the variety of 
equilibrium concepts applicable when large countries interact. 
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6 Alternative tax systems 
This section considers a number of potential tax systems in the light of sections 4 and 5 
drawing on the organisation of Table 1. The two broad questions to be considered are: 
what should be taxed, and where should it be taxed? Each of the subsections below 
investigates options within a specific type of location: source, residence and destination.  
6.1 Source-based taxation 
We begin with source-based taxation, on the grounds that this is the conventional 
approach to taxing corporations. However, in addition to the question considered above, 
whether it is desirable to tax corporate income at source, there is also a definitional 
problem that affects source-based taxation, whether applied to income or some other 
base. Attempting to define the “source” of profit is actually very difficult, and in some 
cases impossible. We can begin with a simple example. Consider an individual resident 
in country A who wholly owns a company which is registered, and which carries out all 
its activities – employment, production, sales - in country B. Then country B is clearly 
the source country. In this simple example, country A is the “residence” country. 
Conventionally, we can also drop sales from the list of activities in B. Suppose that the 
company exports all of its output to country C: then country B remains the source 
country. We refer to country C as the “destination” country.  
Now add a holding company in country D; so that our individual owns the shares in the 
holding company, which in turn owns the shares in the subsidiary located in B. 
Typically D would be thought of as a form of residence country as well: the residence 
of the multinational group. But in practice that may depend the activities undertaken in 
D: typically, it would be seen as the place of residence only if management and control 
were exercised from D.  
Returning to the source country, things rapidly become less simple. Suppose instead 
that this multinational has also two R&D laboratories in countries E and F, a subsidiary 
which provides finance in G, with the final product marketed by another subsidiary in 
H. Each of these activities is a necessary part of the whole which generates worldwide 
profit. There are now potentially five source countries: B, E, F, G and H. A 
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conventional definition of “source” would require the contribution made by each 
subsidiary to worldwide profit to be calculated, with these contributions determined 
using “arm’s length pricing” – the price that would be charged by each subsidiary for its 
services were it dealing with an unrelated party. Of course, this procedure is difficult in 
practice since in many cases no such arm’s length price can be observed; transactions 
between subsidiaries of the same corporation are not replicated between third parties. 
But there is also a more fundamental problem with this approach: the arm’s length price 
may simply not exist even conceptually. As an example, suppose that each R&D 
laboratory has invented, and patented, a crucial element of the production technology. 
Each patent is worthless without the other. One measure of the arms length price of 
each patent is therefore clearly zero – a third party would not be prepared to pay 
anything for a single patent. Another possible measure would be to identify the arm’s 
length price of one patent if the purchaser already owned the other patent. But if both 
patents were valued in this way, then their total value could easily be larger than the 
value of the final output. More generally, suppose that this multinational is a monopolist 
supplier of the final good. Then not only are there no other actual potential purchasers 
of the patents, but if there were, then the value of the patents would be different (and 
generally lower, as more competition is introduced in the industry).  
So identifying how profit is allocated on a source basis between countries B, E, F, G 
and H is not only extremely difficult in practice; there are clearly examples where it is 
conceptually meaningless. This is a fundamental problem of any source-based tax. 
Although it is a problem with which the world had long since learned to live, allocating 
profit among source countries is in practice a source of great complexity and 
uncertainty. Having raised this issue, though, we will now consider specific forms of 
source country taxation, identifying more specific tax bases.  
6.1.1 Standard corporation tax, on the return to equity  
We begin with the most common form of corporate income taxation, which exists in the 
vast majority of developed countries: a source-based tax levied on the return to equity. 
Income is allocated between source countries on the basis of arm’s length pricing. 
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The inefficiencies introduced by such a tax are well known, and have been largely 
outlined above. Because relief is given for debt finance, but not equity finance, it 
generates an incentive to use financial instruments which, for tax purposes at least, have 
the form of debt. In an international context, this creates an incentive to borrow in high-
tax-rate jurisdictions (and lend to them from low-tax-rate jurisdictions), although 
governments try to limit this through the use of thin capitalisation and interest allocation 
rules (which in turn generate further distortions). The welfare costs associated with 
these distortions are, however, hard to pin down. Ultimately, greater use of debt is likely 
to generate higher levels of insolvency and bankruptcy. That generates direct costs of 
bankruptcy, and also possibly indirect costs in terms of the effect on competition in 
specific markets. The costs of the industry which exists to exploit these differential 
effects also represent a welfare cost; though ironically, the more successful this industry 
is in creating financial instruments which are effectively equity, but are treated for tax 
purposes as debt, the lower will be tax-induced bankruptcy. The welfare costs of 
shifting profits between jurisdictions to reduce the overall tax liability are also hard to 
value, as the technology of profit-shifting is difficult to specify.  
A standard source-based income tax also affects the location and scale of investment, as 
discussed in Section 4.1. As reviewed in Section 5, standard analysis indicates that a 
small open economy should not have a sourced-based tax on the return to capital 
located there. If there are economic rents that are specific to a particular location, it may 
in principle be possible for the government to capture those rents through taxation 
without inducing capital to shift out of the country. However, this is more a justification 
for a flow of finds tax, discussed below, since that taxes economic rent. In any case, 
more realistically, it seems infeasible to design a tax system which captures only 
location-specific rents. It may be possible to have a tax system which captures part of 
all economic rents, but this creates a trade-off between capturing the location-specific 
rent, and inducing some capital and mobile rents to flow abroad.18
                                                 
18 From an international perspective, Keen and Piekkola (1997) also show that if governments cannot fully tax away 
economic rent, then it is in principle optimal to allow capital-importing countries to use source-based taxes as an 
indirect way of taxing pure rents. 
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6.1.2 Formula apportionment  
One approach to dealing with the difficulty of determining the source of income is to 
allocate income to countries using measurable quantities that are viewed as proxies for 
income generating activities.  This approach, referred to as formula apportionment, is 
practiced by US states in determining state corporate tax liabilities and has been 
proposed for the EU as well.  Under formula apportionment, the world-wide (or, in the 
case of US states, domestic US) income of a company operating across boundaries are 
divided according to a simple formula based on the fractions of measured activities 
located in each jurisdiction; many US states use a three-factor formula that assigns 
equal weights to shares of assets, payroll and sales in the jurisdiction, although some 
states assign greater, even total, weight to the sales factor. 
While adoption of formula apportionment would simplify the calculation of income for 
any source jurisdiction, it would not eliminate the incentive to shift capital out of a 
high-tax jurisdiction, as long as assets are a factor in assignment of income among 
jurisdiction.  The exact incentives faced by individual companies would depend on the 
extent to which policies were coordinated among countries.19 Such coordination would 
potentially relate not only to the apportionment formula but also to the base used to 
determine taxable income. Absent policy coordination, government incentives to 
engage in tax competition would remain. 
6.1.3 Corporate flow-of-funds tax 
The first reform options we discuss here are the flow-of-funds taxes proposed by the 
Meade Report and outlined in Section 2 above. These taxes – the R base and the R+F 
(equivalently the S) base - were designed to remove two distortions present in the 
standard corporation taxes summarised above; they do not affect decisions as to the 
scale of investment, and they do not discriminate between investment financed by 
different sources of finance. As noted above, they achieve this by leaving a marginal 
                                                 
19 See McLure (1980) and Gordon and Wilson (1986) for a discussion of the effects of formula apportionment of 
business location decisions. 
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investment (one with a zero net present value) untaxed. The tax effectively is raised 
only on economic rent – that is, projects with a positive net present value. 
As noted above, though, a source-based flow-of-funds tax leaves some distortions in 
place, in particular with respect to two important location decisions. Companies making 
discrete location choices will normally consider alternative locations on the basis of a 
comparison of the post-tax net present value. In general this would be affected by a 
flow-of-funds tax. Also, the question of the location of the “source” of the profit is not 
resolved by a “source-based” flow-of-funds tax. Indeed, the incentives to shift profit 
may be greater under a flow-of-funds tax. Since the tax base is smaller than a 
conventional tax, a revenue neutral reform which introduced a flow-of-funds tax would 
require a higher statutory tax rate. In turn, this would create greater incentives for 
shifting profits between jurisdictions. It may also induce the most profitable firms to 
move abroad, leaving the domestic economy with the less profitable firms.20
Three further well-known problems should also be mentioned. The first concerns 
transition effects. If introduced without an appropriate phasing in period (which could 
be very long), then existing capital would be more heavily taxed than new investment. 
To some extent that might be regarded as efficient, if inequitable. However, treating 
competing companies unequally might introduce distortions to competition and hence 
welfare costs, for example, if companies face financial constraints on their activities.  
Second, the neutrality of the tax with respect to investment depends crucially on the tax 
rate being constant over time: indeed, it requires that investors believe that the tax rate 
will not change in the future. If investors expect future returns to be taxed at a different 
rate than current investment is relieved, then marginal investments will be taxed (or 
subsidised). However, this is not only true for flow-of-funds taxes: no realistic tax can 
be neutral with respect to the scale of investment if the tax rate is expected to 
fluctuate.21
                                                 
20 See Bond (2000). 
21 See Bond and Devereux (1995).  
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Third, a pure flow-of-funds tax requires the tax to be symmetric: tax payments must be 
negative when there are taxable losses. For a conventional investment, which involves 
initial capital expenditure, followed subsequently by a return, this implies that the initial 
investment is effectively subsidised. Governments are typically reluctant to provide 
such subsidies, especially through a general tax system - and with some reason, since 
they would enhance the possibility of fraud. The next form of tax we consider is 
designed to lessen this problem.  
6.1.4 Allowance for corporate equity 
A variant of the flow-of-funds tax was initially proposed by Boadway and Bruce (1982) 
and developed by IFS (1991). There are two possible versions. One is closest to the R-
base: instead of giving up-front relief for all investment expenditure, it uses an arbitrary 
depreciation schedule, but compensates for the delay in receiving depreciation 
allowances by giving additional relief which exactly compensates for the delay. A 
version closer to the R+F base would be to continue to allow interest to be deducted, but 
would introduce a separate allowance for the cost of equity finance (the Allowance for 
Corporate Equity, ACE). The size of the ACE allowance is designed to compensate 
exactly for the delay receiving depreciation allowances. In each case, in an uncertain 
environment the rate of relief required for neutrality is the risk-free rate, as long as the 
relief is certain to be received by the company at some point.22 Various forms of the 
ACE tax have been used: Croatia has experimented with it, and Belgium has recently 
introduced it. Brazil and Italy have also used variants.  
Either variant of the flow-of-funds tax avoids the government’s problem of paying a 
proportion of up-front investment costs. Given that the timing difference between 
receiving relief and paying tax on the return is reduced, the ACE system also lessens 
(although does not remove entirely) the sensitivity of investment to tax-rate changes. 
However, all other criticisms of flow-of-funds taxes also apply to these variants.23  
                                                 
22 See Bond and Devereux (1995, 2003).  
23 If the corporation tax is based on economic rent, there is a question as to the appropriate personal taxation of 
income from the corporation. The Meade Committee and IFS (1991) envisaged a tax on economic rent at the 
corporate level being introduced in combination with different forms of consumption tax treatment at the personal 
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6.1.5 Comprehensive Business Income Tax 
The differential treatment of debt and equity can be eliminated in two ways. One is to 
give equity the same treatment as debt – this is essentially the route taken by the ACE 
system, and which results in a tax only on economic rent. The other is a reform in the 
opposite direction: to remove the deductibility of interest from taxable income. This 
was proposed by the US Treasury (1992), and is called the Comprehensive Business 
Income Tax (CBIT). The CBIT results in a single tax on all corporate income, whether 
the source of finance is debt or equity.  
The original proposal envisaged it would be introduced at a rate roughly equal to the top 
marginal personal tax rate on capital income. This would in principle make personal 
taxes on corporate source income redundant, at least in a closed economy. Other things 
being equal, corporate taxable income would be higher under a CBIT than a 
conventional tax. Offsetting this, however, would be a reduction in personal taxes on 
corporate source income if such taxes were abolished. In fact, probably a large 
proportion of interest income is untaxed – for example, if it is received by tax exempt 
pension funds. Overall, a revenue neutral reform would therefore enable a cut in the 
statutory corporation tax rate (although this may imply a significantly lower rate than 
the top marginal personal income tax rate).  
Assuming that there were such a cut, then the effective tax rate on equity-financed 
investment would generally fall, and the effective tax rate on debt-financed investment 
would generally rise, relative a standard corporation tax. The net effect would be to 
reduce distortions to the scale and location of equity-financed investment, but to 
increase the distortions to the scale and location of debt-financed investment (assuming 
that the debt is issued and deductible in the same country as the investment). A lower 
tax rate will probably have a greater net impact on the effective average rate of tax, and 
hence on location decisions. The lower tax rate would also reduce the incentives to shift 
profit at the margin to another jurisdiction.  
                                                                                                                                               
level, so that the overall marginal tax rate on savings was zero. An alternative approach would be to combine a 
source-based corporate tax on economic rent with a residence-based individual tax on the normal return, as proposed 
recently by Kleinbard (2007).  
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There would of course be transitional problems in moving to a CBIT: companies relying 
heavily on debt would be significantly disadvantaged by such a reform. Any such 
reform would therefore have to be phased in slowly to give companies time to adjust 
their financial position. 
6.1.6 Dual income tax 
A variant of the CBIT is the dual income tax, which is used in some Scandinavian 
countries.24 The basic idea of a dual income tax is to have a low tax rate on all capital 
income, while keeping a progressive labour income tax. If the dual income tax were 
imposed solely at the corporate level, then it would have exactly the same structure as 
the CBIT. 
However, the original proposals differ in the tax rate which they envisage on capital 
income. Tying the CBIT rate to the highest rate of personal income tax has the 
advantage of minimising distortions to organisational form: businesses would be 
indifferent to paying income tax or a CBIT corporation tax. However, a high tax rate is 
likely to discourage inward flows of capital and profit. By contrast, proponents of the 
dual income tax point to the need to encourage inward international capital flows as a 
reason for keeping a low tax rate on capital income. In a pure version of the system, the 
corporate income tax rate is matched to the lowest marginal personal income tax rate so 
that only labour income above a certain level is taxed at a higher rate. That though, 
raises the problem of distortions to organisational form: an owner-manager would rather 
take his return in the form of capital income than labour income.25 (Although this 
problem is not unique to the dual income tax; it applies whenever capital income and 
labour income are taxed at different rates).  
A further difference from the CBIT is an important distinction in implementation. 
Instead of levying a single tax rate on all corporate income, dual income taxes tend to 
                                                 
24 See Sørensen (1994, 2005a) and Nielsen and Sørensen (1997). 
25 To prevent such income shifting, Norway has introduced a personal residence-based tax on that part of the 
taxpayer’s realized income from shares which exceeds an imputed rate of interest. This is in principle neutral, since it 
exempts the normal return from tax. At the margin, the total corporate and personal tax burden on corporate equity 
income is close to the top marginal tax rate on labour income. See Sorensen (2005b).  
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give relief for interest paid at the corporate level, as with a conventional corporation 
tax, and instead tax it at the personal level, possibly using a withholding tax, typically 
set at a lower for non-residents. However, this means that interest paid to non-residents 
is typically taxed at a lower rate than interest paid to residents. That reintroduces a 
distinction between debt and equity which is avoided under the CBIT.   
6.2 Residence-based taxation 
In general, identifying a residence country is more straightforward than identifying a 
source country. However, unfortunately this does not imply that residence-based taxes 
would be more straightforward to administer. There are two possible forms of 
residence: the residence of the ultimate individual shareholder, and the residence of the 
legal corporation. We discuss these in turn.  
6.2.1 Residence-based shareholder tax on accrued worldwide profit 
Although the legal residence of some individuals may be open to debate, for the vast 
majority of individuals, their country of residence is easy to identify. Moreover, the vast 
majority of individuals remain relatively immobile. Levying a tax on corporate source 
income at the level of the individual shareholder therefore has important conceptual 
advantages. In particular, since the tax base would not depend on where capital or profit 
were located (i.e. where the source country is), then the location of capital and profit 
would not be distorted by this tax.  
Moreover, the effective incidence of a residence-based tax can be expected to be quite 
different from a source-based tax. A tax levied on the residents of a small open 
economy country will reduce the post-tax rate of return they earn on world markets: it 
will not affect the pre-tax rates of return. Hence the effective incidence of the tax would 
be on the investors. As discussed in Section 5, this is what underlies the economic 
argument favouring residence-based taxes over source-based taxes for small open 
economies. 
Such a tax, in its pure form, is unworkable. Any individual country would be seeking to 
tax corporate income accruing to its residents from throughout the world; either the 
company or the shareholder would have to provide details of that income. The 
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government would have no jurisdiction over companies which were otherwise 
unconnected with that country. The shareholder might own shares in a large number of 
companies worldwide: it would be extremely costly to collect and provide detailed 
information on all of them. For companies which the investor continued to hold, it 
would be necessary to identify the portion of the profit generated, and a tax return based 
on the home government’s taxable income definitions would need to be drawn up. For 
companies which the investor had sold, it would be necessary to identify dividends and 
capital gains earned during the period in which shares were held.  
There would also be a problem of liquidity: it might be necessary to sell part of the asset 
in order to meet the tax liability. Of course, some of these problems would be eased if 
the tax were levied only on income received from foreign investments: but that would 
be a very different tax, which could be avoided by not returning the income to the 
owners, but allowing the investment to accumulate abroad. 
Of course, these problems exist only to the extent that UK residents have direct 
portfolio holdings of foreign securities. In the past, this would not have been of such 
great concern as international portfolio diversification lagged well behind what 
economists might have expected given its apparent risk-pooling advantages. But 
international diversification has been growing, as illustrated above in Figure 7. This 
limits the attractiveness of residence-based shareholder taxation. 
6.2.2 Residence-based corporation tax on accrued worldwide earnings 
An alternative notion of residence is the residence of the company which is the ultimate 
owner of a multinational. Of course, a form of residence-based corporation tax is 
currently common: the UK and the USA, for example, both seek to tax flows of foreign 
dividend income paid by foreign subsidiaries to parent companies. However, the notion 
of residence here is rather less clear-cut. To prevent tax avoidance, countries which seek 
to tax such income typically have rules to determine whether or not the company is 
resident for tax purposes; these rules are usually based on the notion of whether the 
multinational company is managed from that location. 
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The notion of residence-based corporation tax which we aim to discuss here, though, is 
one that taxes the worldwide earnings of the multinational as it accrues, rather than as it 
is repatriated to the parent company. As with a residence-based shareholder tax, taxing 
only repatriations generates a strong incentive for the company to reinvest abroad, 
without returning retained earnings to the parent. Even when countries attempt to 
implement a tax on repatriations, they typically give credit for taxes paid abroad. There 
are various ways of giving such credit, but the net effect is that skilled tax managers can 
arrange the group’s financial affairs to prevent significant liabilities to such home 
country tax.26 Thus, application of the “residence principle” to corporations, in practice, 
bears a strong resemblance to source-based taxation.  
In principle, true residence-based corporate taxation, i.e., a residence-based, accruals-
based corporation tax, has one significant advantage. The home country tax authorities 
need only identify the worldwide taxable income of the multinational company. There 
would be no need to identify “where” the profit was made; all that would matter would 
be the aggregate for the whole multinational. As a consequence – if all countries 
adopted such a tax - there would be no incentive for companies to shift profits between 
subsidiaries in different countries to reduce tax liabilities. Nor would the tax affect the 
location of capital investment.  
However, there are also two significant problems with such a corporation tax. The first 
is feasibility. In this respect, some of the problems of the residence-based shareholder 
tax are also relevant. A multinational company may have hundreds, or even thousands, 
of subsidiaries and branches around the world. Correctly identifying – and where 
necessary, checking – the taxable income in each of these locations would be 
challenging, even if ultimately the taxable income is consolidated into a single measure.    
Second, as discussed in Section 5, unlike shareholders, the ultimate holding company of 
a multinational company is, in principle, mobile. There have certainly been instances of 
holding companies moving location to take advantage of more favourable treatment 
elsewhere. The rules mentioned above are relevant here: the original country of 
                                                 
26 The recent US experience of a temporary reduction in such taxes provides evidence that this is partly due to simply 
leaving the funds abroad.   
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residence may not recognise that the holding company has actually moved unless its 
management and control has moved. But the mobility of the holding company raises a 
question of legitimacy. Suppose there is a holding company residing in the UK which 
earns profit throughout the world. Suppose also that the relevant economic activity does 
not take place in the UK, the shareholders do not live in the UK, and the consumers of 
the final products do not live in the UK. What right would the UK have to tax the 
worldwide profit of that company? It is hard to think of a convincing rationale. And in 
any case, if the UK attempted to impose a high tax rate then it seems very likely that the 
holding company would move to another location. 
In short, while true residence-based taxation, at either the individual level or the 
corporate level, offers potential advantages, neither system is feasible to adopt. The 
partial approach currently practiced in the UK, which focuses on the corporate level and 
lies somewhere in between residence- and source-based taxation, lacks obvious 
advantages other than its feasibility. 
6.3 Destination-based taxation 
The term “destination-based” taxation is taken from the literature on indirect taxes, 
which has debated the merits of destination-based taxes, based on where the final 
consumer lives and purchases a good or service, compared to an origin-based tax, based 
on where the good or service is created.  
6.3.1 Corporate cash flow tax 
Given the difficulties in implementing taxes on a source or residence basis which are 
both feasible and non-distorting, it is worth considering whether a tax on corporate 
income could be levied on a destination basis. If that were possible then the tax would 
avoid distorting the location of capital and profit.  
However, while it is clearly possible to identify final sales taking place in a country, 
those sales may be based on imported goods. The cost of producing those imported 
goods would have been borne elsewhere. A crucial issue is how costs can be set against 
income. Further, clearly a single plant in one country, say A, could supply final goods 
to a large number of other countries: how can the costs borne in A be allocated against 
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income generated elsewhere? One option would be to take a simple formula: say to 
allocate costs to foreign countries in the same proportion as the value of final sales 
across those countries. This would effectively be a form of formula apportionment, as 
discussed above in the context of source-based taxes, where the formula was based only 
on final sales. This, and other possibilities, would require a significant degree of 
cooperation between tax authorities in identifying the size of costs and the value of 
goods sold in possibly a large number of other countries. 
An alternative would be to organise the tax in the same way as a destination-based 
VAT. Indeed, value added as measured by VAT is equal to the sum of economic rent 
and labour income. In a closed economy, a VAT which also gave relief for labour costs 
would be equivalent to an R-based cash flow tax. All real costs, including labour costs, 
but not financial costs, would be deductible from the tax base. In an open economy, a 
destination-based VAT which also gave relief for labour costs would be a destination-
based, R-based, flow-of-funds tax. Since it would be equivalent to an R-based tax, it 
would not affect financial policy, nor would it affect the scale of investment. And since 
it would be levied on a destination-basis, it would not affect the location of capital or 
profit.  
How would such a destination-based cash flow tax allocate costs between countries? It 
would relieve those costs in the country in which they were incurred. Just as for VAT, 
an exporting company is not taxed on its exports (although the import would be taxed in 
the destination country). Any VAT a company has already paid on intermediate goods 
is refunded. A destination-based cash flow tax would also need to give a refund to 
reflect the cost of labour. A company which exported all its goods would therefore face 
a negative tax liability, reflecting tax relief for the cost of its labour.  
On the face of it, this does not seem very feasible. Although countries would not be 
subsidising exports (since the export price would be unaffected), they may face negative 
tax payments. Offsetting that, of course, is the fact that they would be taxing imports. 
Its overall revenue position would therefore depend on the balance of trade. However, 
one way of avoiding negative tax payments is to make offsetting adjustments to income 
tax: the destination-based cash flow tax would also be equivalent to simply increasing 
the rate of VAT, while making an offsetting reduction to taxes on labour income.  
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Although it should be clear that such a combination of taxes would not distort the 
location of capital or profit, it is worth noting that the economic literature on VAT has 
identified conditions under which a destination-based VAT and an origin-based VAT 
have exactly the same real effects. This raises the question of whether a source-based 
and destination-based cash flow tax would also be equivalent.  Under certain conditions, 
these taxes would have the same incentive effects, differing only with respect to the 
income effects working through the impact on the owners of domestic and foreign 
assets.27 However, these conditions include that there must be a single tax rate on all 
goods and no cross-border shopping or labour mobility between countries, conditions 
that are not met in practice.28
A destination-based cash flow tax, however implemented, would have desirable 
properties: the scale and location of investment, and the use of different forms of 
finance, would all be unaffected by the tax. There would also be no incentive to shift 
profits to low tax-rate jurisdictions: an advantage which applies even if the above 
conditions for equivalence hold. Offsetting this is the underlying need for the source 
country to give relief for the cost of labour, even if the final good is exported and hence 
not taxed in that jurisdiction. Like Meade’s R-base flow-of-funds tax, there is also a 
problem in taxing financial companies which generate profit through an interest rate 
spread. If interest is not taxed at the corporate level, then this form of profit would be 
untaxed (as it is under a VAT). 
A characteristic of the corporate cash-flow tax is that it relinquishes the claim to 
domestic location-specific production rents. By imposing a tax based on destination, a 
country forgoes any attempt to tax rents that accrue to companies as a result of 
operating in its jurisdiction (source-based rents) as well as rents that might accrue as the 
result of residence. The corporate cash-flow tax, like a VAT, is a tax on domestic 
consumption. (Since labour income is not taxed, it differs from VAT in being a tax on 
domestic consumption from non-labour income.) It therefore imposes no burden on the 
consumption of those abroad who benefit from local rents. On the other hand, it does 
                                                 
27 See Auerbach (1997). 
28 See, for example, Lockwood (2001).  
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impose a tax on the location-specific rents at home and abroad that accrue to domestic 
consumers. Thus, a country with considerable location-specific rents might lose by 
adopting a destination-based tax, but even in this case the loss might be offset by the 
advantages already discussed. 
6.3.2 Destination-based income taxation 
Given the advantages of a destination-based corporate tax over a source-based tax, it is 
worth considering whether a similar approach might be taken in the context of an 
income-based tax, rather than a flow-of-funds tax. To keep the analysis as similar as 
possible to that already considered, consider the conversion of a destination-based flow-
of-funds tax into a destination-based income tax, accomplished by providing only a 
fractional deduction for the purchase of investment goods.29 The company’s tax base 
would be higher than under a pure flow-of-funds tax, as expected, but it would now also 
have an incentive to understate the prices of investment goods produced by a subsidiary, 
foreign or domestic, since it would get to deduct only part of the cost of the investment. 
The problem is the same that exists in the purely domestic context under the traditional 
corporate income taxes with respect to self-constructed assets: a firm that creates its 
own assets essentially gets to expense the investment, because it treats all costs incurred 
in producing the asset as current expenditures. Thus, it has the same incentive when 
dealing with a related party to minimize the cost attributed to the purchase of capital 
goods, whether that related party is domestic or foreign. It is unclear how big a problem 
this is. To the extent that most capital expenditures are at arm’s length, then a 
destination-based approach to income taxation might be feasible, but, feasibility aside, it 
is not clear under what circumstances it would be desirable to impose an income tax on 
a destination basis. That is, why would a country wish to tax capital income associated 
only with its domestic sales? 
                                                 
29 This is the approach suggested in the domestic context by Auerbach and Jorgenson (1980). 
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7 Conclusions 
This paper has considered the design of taxes on corporate income. We began with the 
proposals of the Meade Committee (1978) for a flow-of funds tax, and analysed how 
these proposals fare thirty years later, in the light of important developments in 
economies and economic thought.  
We considered two principal dimensions in the choice of a tax on corporate income. 
The first dimension is the base of the tax. Here we compared a standard corporation tax, 
levied on the return to shareholders with two alternatives: a tax on economic rent, as 
proposed by the Meade Committee, and a tax on the return to all capital, such as under 
the Comprehensive Business Income Tax and the dual income tax. The second 
dimension is geographic: where should the income be taxed? Here we contrasted the 
typical approach of source-based taxation to the alternatives of residence and 
destination bases.  
The “optimal” tax system depends partly on why the tax is levied. If it is intended to be 
a substitute for taxing the capital income of domestic residents, then its form could be 
very different from the case in which it is intended to capture the location-specific rent 
earned by non-residents. Given the increasing cross-ownership of shareholdings across 
countries, using a source-based tax on corporate income as a substitute for a residence-
based tax on shareholders seems increasingly problematic. In open economies, much 
domestic economic activity is owned and controlled by non-residents; conversely, much 
of the accretion to wealth of residents takes place abroad. The argument for taxing 
source-based economic rent depends on the extent to which that rent is location-
specific. At one extreme case (equivalent to a closed economy) all rent is location-
specific and can therefore be captured in tax without distorting investment.  But at the 
other extreme, it is possible that little or no rent is location-specific: companies could 
earn equivalent profit by locating their activities elsewhere. In the latter case, a source-
based tax on rent (such as proposed by the Meade Committee) could divert economic 
activity abroad, where it could face a lower tax rate.  
One important aspect of the Meade proposals was to avoid a distinction in the tax 
system between debt and equity. Meade considered two proposals, each of which 
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effectively eliminated the distinction. Avoiding this distinction has become even more 
important issue since, as the boundaries between the two forms of financial instrument 
have become increasingly blurred. That consideration points to a tax which falls either 
on the whole return to investment, or only on economic rent. However, this is not 
straightforward either, since in either case the tax base still requires that distinctions be 
made either between real and financial income flows or between debt and equity. There 
is no obvious way to simultaneously avoid distinctions. Differentiating between real and 
financial flows also creates additional problems in taxing the income of financial 
companies. 
Moving from predominantly source-based corporate taxation to residence-based 
taxation is not an attractive option. Taxing corporate income in the hands of the parent 
company is in any case more like source-based taxation, since the location of the parent 
is not fixed. So true residence-based taxation would have to be at the level of the 
individual investor; but in a globalised world, this is scarcely feasible.  
An alternative would be a destination-based tax, levied where the sale to a final 
consumer is made. A flow-of-funds destination-based tax could be implemented along 
the lines of a destination-based VAT: the main distinction from the Meade proposals is 
that exports would be tax-exempt and imports would be taxed. This distinction implies 
that discrete location choices would not be affected by the tax, and there would also be 
considerably lower opportunity for companies to shift profits between countries. 
However, an implication of such a tax, if introduced in VAT form, is that a country 
introducing it would need to give relief for labour costs borne in the production of 
untaxed exports. The neutrality advantages of such a tax to a system are somewhat less 
clear if the normal return to capital is to be taxed. 
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